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In mid-2012 the Foreign Ministers of Italy, 
Poland,  Spain  and  Sweden  took  the 
initiative  to  launch  the  debate  on  a 
“European  Global  Strategy”  and  invited 
think tanks to set up a dialogue leading to 
the delivery of a report by May 2013. 
This paper will argue that the objective should 
be to pave the way for political discussions at 
the highest level and eventually the adoption by 
the  European  Council  of  a  global  security 
strategy. It is labelled “global” to indicate that 
this strategy is not only dealing with the EU’s 
Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies , CFSP 
and CSDP sensu stricto , but is to encapsulate 
all  security  aspects  related  to  EU  external 
action. In other words, a European Global Security 
Strategy (EGSS) should be aimed at.  
 
The initiative is at present attracting positive 
attention  in  most  if  not  all  of  the  other 
European capitals, as well as in EU institutional 
circles.  However  there  is  some  fear  that  the 
project  will  entail  unproductive  theoretical 
discussions, preventing any practical progress in 
CFDP and CSDP and is therefore, in view of 
the  December  Council  summit  of  Defence, 
questionable.  
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But an EGSS it more about fostering swift 
decision-making  at  critical  moments  and 
eliminating  stumbling  blocks  at  present 
causing a standstill in CFSP and CSDP as well 
as in other critical areas - related to security. A 
strategy  without  means  is  indeed  a 
hallucination.  However,  expecting  Heads  of 
State and Government to free up budgets for 
“required  civil  and  military  capabilities” 
without consensus on the aims, is rather naive. 
Breaking  this  vicious  circle  is  essential. 
Moreover  an  EGSS  is  “the”  instrument  to 
translate  the  EU  mantra  on  “comprehensive 
crisis management” into practice. It is also to 
avoid that in the future the Union would be 
confronted with crisis management operations 
in which so few have to do so much in the 
name of so many, leaving public opinion with 
the question what “Europe” really is about.  
 
THE SEVEN-LEAGUE BOOTS 
1)  1) To act or not to act, with premeditation  
The main purpose of a security strategy is to 
provide  guidance  for  the  development  of 
longer  term  policies  to  protect  commonly 
agreed values and interests, built on a shared 
view  of  the  key  threats.  Its  more  practical 
value is to support the political leadership in 
decision-making  when  confronted  with  the 
question whether it is appropriate for the EU 
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to launch an operation or to take some specific 
action in order to cope with particular events 
endangering its security.  
 
The  outbreak  of  a  crisis  is  not  the  ideal 
moment to start a debate on whether in this 
particular event any robust action from the EU 
is a priority or not, and subsequently to develop 
from  scratch  a  series  of  potential  ad  hoc 
strategies, while at the same time the window 
for preventive action is closing.  
 
The  EGSS  is  to  foster  a  common 
understanding  on  when  the  threshold  for 
robust  action  is  reached  and  when  to  trigger 
pre-planned  scenarios.  The  aim  is  to  ease 
preventive action, make possible urgent action, 
and  to  ensure  global  coherence  within  the 
Union and among Member States.  
 
Obtaining durable results is of the essence. 
This  implies  that  at  all  times  the  political 
objectives of specific CSDP operations and EU 
programmes dealing with security must be part 
and  parcel  of  a  comprehensive  approach 
derived  from  a  longer-term  strategy,  from  a 
longer-term desired political end-state.  
 
However, the principal goal of an EGSS to 
ensure the ultimate desired political outcome is 
reached step by step.  
 
2) Political and public support 
The EGSS will be a working document for all 
of the EU institutions, in particular the Council, 
the  Commission  and  the  EEAS,  and  is  to 
inspire Member States. But it is also to become 
a public document.  
 
The EGSS has the vocation to create broad 
awareness on European security aspects and to 
stimulate  the  debate,  not  only  within  EU 
institutions, the EP and National Parliaments, 
but also among public opinion. The objective is 
to gain political and public support.  
 
The  EGSS  is  not  to  be  become  a  highly 
technical  nor  a  detailed  document,  rather  an 
overarching guideline from which subsequently 
a series of more detailed sub-strategies are to 
be derived. 
 
Ideally it should be composed of a limited 
number  of  short  and  sharp  paragraphs.  An 
easy read, providing the general background to 
better  understand  why  at  given  times  some 
political decisions are taken to safeguard our 
common European values and interests.  
 
2)  3)  Continuity  – A  E u r o p e a n  S e c u r i t y  
Strategy Plus 
3)  The  European  Security  Strategy  published  in 
2003 is still a valid document. The European 
Global  Security  Strategy  is  to  incorporate  it, 
and to complement and update it. Since then 
the world has changed, and so has the Union. 
4)   
Where the 2003 ESS, a daring document at 
the  time,  was  stipulating  “how”  the  Union 
should tackle security issues, the EGSS is now 
to  address  all  other  aspects  characterising  a 
security  strategy,  in  particular  who  is  to  do 
what,  where,  and  with  which  means. 
Moreover, it is to provide specific guidelines 
on  military,  civilian-military  and  civilian 
operations. But the scope has to be broadened 
even  more,  beyond  the  traditional  3  D 
approach even. We are at present witnessing a 
growing  “economization”  of  security.  This 
requires that economic governance and related 
policies be considered as well.  
 
4) Means to the ends 
The objective of the EGSS is to enable the EU 
to steer events so as to protect our common 
objectives. The power of the EU to influence 
other relevant actors on the world scene or to 
manage specific global threats is not equal to 
the  sum  of  all  of  the  separate  instruments, 
assets  and  capabilities  Europeans  are  able  to 
mobilise.  When  confronted  with  specific 
issues,  the  weakest  link  will  determine  the 
outcome. There are instruments of hard and 
soft power, but hard or soft power as such is   3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
inexistent. There is only power. Real power lies 
in  a  holistic  and  tailored  approach  and  the 
ability to mobilise all of the required means at 
the right moment.  
 
It is common wisdom that preventive action 
requires  considerably  less  means.  Whenever 
decisions to intervene have to be taken within a 
number of days or even less, it is vital to have a 
strategy ensuring that the instruments and the 
necessary  stand-by  assets  are  available  at  all 
times.  
 
No matter how good a strategy may look on 
paper, without means it remains a paper. Up-
front indentifying of the required means is of 
the essence. With the exception of procedures 
and  assets  for  urgent  action,  most  of  the 
indispensable  means  to  launch  CSDP 
operations  have  been  identified  more  than  a 
decade  ago,  as  well  as  the  ever  persisting 
strategic  shortfalls.  “Pooling”  shortfalls  is 
regretfully not an option. “Sharing” frustration 
is one. Developing a common strategy to solve 
them is better one .  
 
The  EGSS  is  to  bridge  goals  and  means. 
Only when at the political level there is a clear 
vision on the ends to pursue, will the debate on 
priorities,  shortfalls  and  redundancies  and, 
finally, on budgets gather substance.  
 
5) First priority: Overall coherence 
History, geography, and new emerging threats 
all  have  their  respective  rights  to  influence 
priorities. Within the Union this has led to the 
development  of  a  series  of  Strategic 
Partnerships  and  of  specific  policies,  such  as 
the one on the Neighbourhood. However, in 
this context the word “strategic” is merely put 
forward  to  underline  the  importance  of  the 
matter, not necessarily to point to a strategic 
approach. 
 
At  present  the  EEAS  is  developing  sub-
strategies,  each  time  focused  on  a  specific 
region, such as the Sahel or the Horn of Africa. 
However, when push comes to shove not all 
Members  States  seem  to  consider  themselves 
all that concerned.  
 
It is clear that this very constructive bottom-
up  approach  has  reached  its  limits  and  is  in 
need of an overarching framework.  
 
Moreover,  nothing  but  an  overarching 
strategy  can  do  away  with  the  ongoing  and 
rather unproductive debate on the priority to 
be given to a particular region or to a particular 
global security threat. Security is indivisible. If 
there is a common understanding on the values 
and interests to defend as well as on a common 
threat analysis - all essential parts of an EGSS - 
responses  to  be  given  to  raising  events  will 
become more obvious. 
 
6) The EEAS as facilitator and coordinator 
The  EEAS  is  indeed  to  be  seen  as  the  EU 
coordinator  on  foreign  policy  but  also  as  an 
actor at the EU level to some extent equivalent 
to  the  National  Security  Council  and  the 
National Economic Council in the US as far as 
their  work  on  security  aspects  is  related  to 
foreign  policy  and  international  economic 
issues.  Within  the  EU,  the  EEAS  is  the 
indicated  forum  for  considering  European 
security matters at large, to advise on actions to 
be taken and to coordinate the implementation 
of  policies  among  the  varies  actors,  the  EU 
institutions and the Member States.  
 
The coordinating role of the EEAS is not to 
be compared solely to a Foreign Office at EU 
level. It scope has to go beyond the traditional 
Diplomacy,  Development  and  Defence.  The 
potential security aspects of other policies for 
which  the  EU  has  competence,  e.g.  trade, 
industry,  competition  and  even  agriculture, 
protection  of  data  and  intelligence  gathering, 
have  also  to  be  considered.  A  permanent 
dialogue with Member States on these issues is 
indicated as well. The context and the division 
of  labour  is  to  be  provided  by  a  commonly 
agreed EGSS.   4   
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7) Political ownership and permanent steering  
It is vital that all actors involved have ownership 
of the EGSS. If it is perceived as “just another 
document” from either the Commission or the 
EEAS,  or  as  just  an  initiative  from  “some” 
Member  States,  the  added  value  will  be 
negligible. 
 
The process towards an EGSS should ensure 
that  all  Members  States,  regardless  of  size,  be 
part of the discussion and decision-making. In 
the end, for Member States it is about regaining 
sovereignty  on  a  level  able  to  cope  with  the 
common  problems  of  security,  similar  to  all 
other EU policies developed so far. And these 
particular  common  problems  are  indeed 
sensitive. Urgent as well.  
 
A  global  security  strategy,  actions  and 
investment  related  to  security,  to  civil  and 
military operations are “Chefsache”. Therefore 
it is vital that discussions on an EGSS and its 
final adoption take place at the level of Heads 
of State and Government and are based on the 
broadest consensus. It is important to draw the 
right lessons from operations such as in Libya 
and in Mali, including on the absence of any 
shared security strategy.  
 
It is obvious that an EGSS - as is the case 
for each and every security strategy - has to be 
the  subject  of  regular  political  attention  and 
regular  updates,  at  least  once  every  EU 
legislative  term.  An  annual  “State  of  the 
Union”  on  global  security  provided  by  the 
President of the Council and the President of 
the Commission is deemed appropriate as well.  
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